Nuclear Power as State Strategy

China and Russia and the Evolution of “Non-Military Hegemonic Infrastructure”

Executive Summary

China and Russia now dominate global nuclear power construction not because of superior reactor technology alone, but because they share a strategic redefinition of nuclear energy.

For both countries, nuclear power is no longer primarily an energy solution. It is a long-duration instrument for locking in interstate relationships, enabling geopolitical influence without the use of military force.

This report analyzes:

• China’s state-capitalist, internally complete nuclear model
• Russia’s export-oriented, dependency-locking nuclear diplomacy
• The shared strategic logic underpinning both approaches
• The implications for emerging economies and the global order

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Chapter 1: Redefining Nuclear Power — From Energy Choice to State Commitment

Unlike renewables or fossil fuels, nuclear power has structural characteristics that fundamentally alter its geopolitical role:

• Construction timelines measured in decades
• Continuous dependence on fuel supply and technical support
• Extremely high exit costs once projects begin

As a result, adopting nuclear power is not an energy policy decision alone. It is:

A long-term commitment of institutional alignment, technological dependence, and diplomatic continuity with the supplier state.

China and Russia recognized this earlier than Western economies and embedded it into national strategy.

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Chapter 2: The China Model — State Capitalism and Internal Completion

China’s nuclear strategy is built on a fully domesticated and vertically integrated ecosystem.

Key elements include:

• Reactor design: domestically developed models (e.g., Hualong One)
• Construction: state-owned heavy engineering and construction firms
• Operations: national power utilities
• Financing: policy banks
• Regulation: centralized government oversight

This architecture allows China to:

1. Deploy reactors at scale domestically
2. Accumulate learning effects and reduce costs
3. Export mature, standardized systems abroad

Crucially, exports are not the primary objective. They are a natural extension of domestic scale dominance.

This model is structurally incompatible with Western systems that separate regulation, finance, and operations—and therefore difficult to challenge.

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Chapter 3: The Russia Model — Nuclear Exports as Geopolitical Lock-In

Russia, by contrast, prioritizes foreign deployment over domestic expansion.

Its strategy is executed through the state nuclear corporation Rosatom, which offers comprehensive, long-term packages that include:

• Reactor design and construction
• Fuel supply
• Operational support
• Financing

The critical feature of the Russian model is irreversibility:

• Projects cannot be abandoned once initiated
• Alternative suppliers are scarce or nonexistent
• Fuel dependency persists for decades

As a result, nuclear exports function as:

A mechanism for sustaining influence and anchoring bilateral relationships without military presence.

Even under sanctions, recipient states remain structurally tied to Russia.

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Chapter 4: Why Emerging Economies Find Both Models Rational

Despite differences, China and Russia converge on a key insight: the constraints facing emerging economies.

These typically include:

• Urgent electricity shortages
• Limited fiscal capacity
• Insufficient regulatory and technical infrastructure
• Preference for swift political decision-making

Both countries respond by offering:

• Reduced upfront financial burdens
• Government-to-government negotiation frameworks
• Turnkey delivery of technology, financing, fuel, and human capital

The decisive advantage is not cost alone, but:

The ability to deliver a complete, functioning solution without requiring institutional transplantation.

This contrasts sharply with Western models that assume regulatory convergence and private-sector risk absorption.

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Chapter 5: Divergence in Strategic Narrative

While structurally similar, the two models diverge in intent and framing.

China: Growth-Linked Expansion

• Emphasizes development, industrialization, and shared growth
• Integrates nuclear exports into broader infrastructure and trade initiatives
• Frames relationships as long-term economic partnerships

Russia: Dependency-Based Stabilization

• Emphasizes energy security and continuity
• Embeds fuel and maintenance dependence into contracts
• Prioritizes geopolitical durability over economic spillovers

In short:

• China uses nuclear power to expand economic space
• Russia uses nuclear power to stabilize geopolitical space

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Conclusion: Nuclear Power as Non-Military Hegemonic Infrastructure

The common strategic insight shared by China and Russia is decisive:

Once operational, a nuclear power plant becomes a geopolitical asset, not an energy asset.

While Western economies debated safety, cost, and public acceptance, China and Russia reconceptualized nuclear power as:

• A long-term relationship-locking mechanism
• A substitute for military basing
• A tool for durable influence in a fragmented global order

In the coming decades, nuclear power will not primarily shape energy markets.

It will shape the architecture of international dependence.

In this sense, nuclear policy is no longer energy policy.
It is state strategy, implemented quietly and over generations.